The Democratic Republic of Congo has flagged health workforce management and compensation as issues requiring attention, including the problem of ghost workers (individuals on payroll who do not exist and/or show up at work). Recognising the need for reliable health workforce information, the government has worked to implement iHRIS, an open source human resources information system that facilitates health workforce management. In Kasaï Central and Kasaï Provinces, health workers brought relevant documentation to data collection points, where trained teams interviewed them and entered contact information, identification, photo, current job, and employment and education history into iHRIS on laptops. After uploading the data, the Ministry of Public Health used the database of over 11 500 verified health worker records to analyse health worker characteristics, density, compensation, and payroll. Both provinces had less than one physician per 10 000 population and a higher urban versus rural health worker density. Most iHRIS-registered health workers (57% in Kasaï Central and 73% in Kasaï) reported receiving no regular government pay of any kind (salaries or risk allowances). Payroll analysis showed that 27% of the health workers listed as salary recipients in the electronic payroll system were ghost workers, as were 42% of risk allowance recipients. As a result, the Ministries of Public Health, Public Service, and Finance reallocated funds away from ghost workers to cover salaries (n ¼ 781) and risk allowances (n ¼ 2613) for thousands of health workers who were previously under-or uncompensated due to lack of funds. The reallocation prioritised previously under-or uncompensated mid-level health workers, with 49% of those receiving salaries and 68% of those receiving risk allowances representing cadres such as nurses, laboratory technicians, and midwifery cadres. Assembling accurate health worker records can help governments understand health workforce characteristics and use data to direct scarce domestic resources to where they are most needed.
Introduction
Countries need well-trained, well-distributed, and motivated health workers to meet health-related development goals. Building and maintaining a strong and suitable health workforce can be exceptionally challenging in low-resource and fragile states where factors such as conflict and chronic underinvestment can hamper attempts to cultivate the health sector (Doull and Campbell 2008) .
The Fragile States Index 2016 rates the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as one of the top eight most fragile states worldwide, in company with countries like Syria and South Sudan (Fund for Peace 2016). The DRC is also one of the world's poorest countries despite abundant natural resources. In this challenging context, estimates suggest that there are only 1.1 qualified physicians and 5.3 qualified nurses and midwives per 10 000 population (Kinfu et al. 2009) , which is far beneath the World Health Organization's (WHO's) recommended bare-bones minimum of 23 qualified physicians, nurses and midwives per 10 000 population (WHO 2016) . Moreover, qualified health workers are more likely to work in the DRC's urban areas and higher-level facilities, while health care in rural areas is more limited and fragmented (Fox et al. 2014; Bertone et al. 2016) .
Health workers in the DRC include civil service employees as well as those working in the private for-profit, faith-based and informal sectors. For anyone employed in the civil service, including health workers, possession of a matriculation or employee registration number ('numéro de matricule') is a firm prerequizite for drawing a salary from the Ministry of Public Service (Fox et al. 2014) . The matriculation number signifies that a health worker has been formally taken up into the civil service and is qualified for her or his post. Overall, however, only an estimated one-third (32%) of health workers in the civil service are salaried (Fox et al. 2014; Bertone et al. 2016) . This is because a sizeable proportion of health workers in the civil service-many of whom already have been in their posts for several or more years-have not been given a matriculation number and, therefore, cannot draw a salary. These health workers instead carry the status of 'new' public sector employees ('nouvelle unité'). Independently of matriculation status, all civil service health workers theoretically also should receive a monthly 'risk allowance' ('prime de risque') from the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). In practice, surveys have found that only about half of health workers report receiving risk allowances, which are inconsistent in amount (Fox et al. 2014; Maini et al. 2017) .
These undependable government compensation mechanisms have fostered a work climate in which health workers in the DRC's civil service (as well as many working outside the civil service) obtain much of their income through non-salary channels (Bertone et al. 2016; Maini et al. 2017) . Some sources of remuneration come from international nongovernmental organisation and other external partners in the form of performance-and results-based financing schemes and per diems (Bertone et al. 2016; Maini et al. 2017) . Other income streams derive from informal or even 'predatory' practices (Trefon 2009 ), including parallel economic activities within and outside the health sector, patient 'gifts' and unofficial facility user fees, which account for nearly half of overall health care financing in the DRC (Fox et al. 2014; Bertone et al. 2016) . Because user fees are informal, non-standardised, and do not derive from government policy, each health facility is free to set user fee amounts autonomously and determine the proportion of the user payments that it will allocate to health worker remuneration (Gerstl et al. 2013) .
For the subset of civil service employees receiving salaries and/or risk allowances, the DRC introduced a 'bancarisation' ('extension of banking services') initiative in 2011 that requires employees to have bank accounts into which salaries are directly deposited, replacing the previous reliance on easily diverted cash salary payments. Given that the DRC is one of the 'least banked' nations in Africa, with over 95% of the population lacking a bank account (Mthembu-Salter 2015) , 'bancarisation' represents a significant shift toward a more formal payroll system. According to the Ministry of Finance, 'bancarisation' offers myriad benefits (Lutete 2014) . One unanticipated but potentially positive outcome of 'bancarisation' is that it has drawn attention to the widespread problem of ghost workers-individuals who are listed on payroll but do not actually exist and/or show up at work (Dovlo 2005; Fox et al. 2014) . Under 'bancarisation', only an account holder presenting appropriate identification can withdraw salary payments. Payments to non-existent workers accumulate at the bank, therefore, and after a determined period of time the unclaimed funds are automatically returned to the central bank.
In this complex context, the MoPH has flagged health workforce management and compensation as critical issues requiring attention, particularly following implementation in mid-2015 of an administrative and territorial reform called 'découpage' ('cutting up'). 'Découpage', initially introduced as a constitutional change in 2006, involves subdividing the country's previous 11 provinces into 26 new provinces to bring provincial administrations and health system governance 'closer to. . .citizens' (Faure 2015) . The MoPH recognises that effective health workforce management at both the provincial and central levels is contingent on reliable health workforce information. Consequently, the MoPH's work plan has prioritised putting in place an electronic human resources information system (HRIS) that it can update and use at multiple levels, complementing the customised electronic payroll management system (SYGECPAF) established by the Ministry of Finance in 2015 to track and pay health workers in the civil service (Ministry of Public Health 2011 , 2014 .
Through the 'Accès aux Soins de Santé Primaires' (Access to Primary Health Care) project-led by the faith-based nonprofit
Key Messages
• The Democratic Republic of Congo has flagged health workforce management and compensation as key issues requiring attention, including the problem of ghost workers.
• A sizeable proportion of health workers in the civil service receive no government compensation.
• A Ministry of Public Health-led effort to conduct a high-quality census and analyse the payroll of all civil service health workers in two provinces enabled timely answers to a number of pressing health workforce questions, including identifying ghost workers and reallocating salaries and allowances to previously uncompensated health workers.
• Establishing a high-quality human resources information system is an important step toward effective health workforce management and efficient targeting of scarce domestic resources.
IMA World Health (2017) (Driessen et al. 2015; iHRIS n.d.; Spero et al. 2011) . Twenty-four countries around the world currently use iHRIS to manage health workforce information (Liebhardt 2016) . The iHRIS Manage component of the software suite facilitates health workforce tracking, management, deployment and mapping (iHRIS n.d.). This article describes how the meticulous assembly of accurate health worker records in iHRIS helped the MoPH understand key health workforce characteristics and use data to differentiate actual health workers from ghost workers so as to reallocate limited financial resources to where they are most needed.
Materials and methods
The 26 provinces that now make up the DRC's health system comprise 516 health zones (comparable to districts), and the health zones, in turn, represent the 'basic unit' of the primary health care system (Bertone et al. 2016; Maini et al. 2017) . Kasaï Central and Kasaï (which together were formerly the province of Kasaï Occidentale) are two of the four provinces in which the MoPH has implemented iHRIS with IntraHealth technical assistance. Beginning in October, 2015, these two provinces-benefiting from strong and committed provincial-level governments and effective logistics support-were the first to adopt iHRIS and the only two, to date, to have the logistic and staff resources to carry out the subsequent in-depth payroll analysis that is the primary focus of this article. Kasaï Central and Kasaï are located on the DRC's southern border with Angola. Each province has a population of more than four million, and together they represent 10% of the DRC's overall population of 80 million. Implementing iHRIS requires designing a database that reflects the country's health workforce structure, collecting and verifying health worker data, and training users. In other countries, health worker data typically are assembled through examination of paper forms that make their way up the administrative chain. In the DRC, six trained four-person teams of MoPH and IntraHealth personnel used a two-stage process to painstakingly interview health workers in each health zone in person. During the first phase, the MoPH requested that health workers present themselves to data collection points with original supporting documents showing identification, education and employment. Upon presentation, interviewers compared names against the most up-to-date listing of health workers available (the 'liste déclarative', created by the health zone management teams). Although authorities recognised that the names included on the 'liste déclarative' at any given point in time represent somewhat of a moving target, the lists nonetheless provided a logical starting point for identifying and verifying current health workers. The teams also counted valid health workers (verified by supervisors) who were unable to appear for an in-person interview due to off-site training or other officially sanctioned absences; in these cases, the teams created an iHRIS health worker record using available personnel records as supporting documentation, although it was sometimes difficult to obtain a photo. When health workers who were not on the list showed up for interviews, the iHRIS supervisors sought to verify their identity and position with the worker's direct supervisor and/or the health zone's chief medical officer. Each face-to-face interview took 10-15 min, depending on the completeness of records. During the interviews, the iHRIS teams entered six broad categories of health worker information (contact information, identification, photo, current job and employment and education history) directly into iHRIS on laptop computers and uploaded the data to an online database for analysis. The data collection teams also carried out rigorous data quality checks on a daily basis, including physically reviewing presented documents and comparing uploaded data against existing health worker records.
During the second round of data collection and verification, the iHRIS teams returned to each province to provide health workers who had missed the first visit with a final opportunity to present themselves for inclusion in iHRIS. Health workers who could not be located or confirmed after these two attempts or who presented improper documentation (including falsified documents) were excluded from iHRIS. Excluded individuals could submit an appeal for further review by an appeals commission comprised of provincial and national-level government and ministry officials. Health workers whose appeals were successful were entered into the final iHRIS database in each province.
The final iHRIS database included health workers who had received training at the secondary school level (some nursing/midwifery cadres, pharmacy assistants, laboratory and other technicians, administrative staff) as well as cadres with university-level training (physicians, some nursing/midwifery cadres, pharmacists, oral surgeons, physical therapists, nutritionists, managers and others). After verification of all records, the MoPH used the comprehensive iHRIS data to analyse health workers' demographic and job characteristics, health worker density by health zone, allocation and cost of compensation, and other policyrelevant health workforce topics. In addition, in mid-2016, a specially formed interministerial committee composed of personnel from the MoPH, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Public Service, with support from IntraHealth, conducted an in-depth payroll analysis in the two provinces. Although iHRIS is not linked to the Ministry of Finance's SYGECPAF payroll system, the committee was able to compare iHRIS entries with data from SYGECPAF about who was being paid (and where). The committee carried out this analysis using in-house software to match names, supplemented by some manual matching.
Results

Health worker records
The interviews generated iHRIS records for over 11 500 health workers across the two provinces (Table 1) . Roughly 2500 health workers were not included in the iHRIS database (Table 1) , either because they could not be located after two attempts (see 'Materials and methods' Section), presented improper or falsified documentation, or were unsuccessful in later petitions to the appeals commission. Those with improper documentation included health workers presenting educational or training diplomas that did not actually qualify them to perform their current job. Falsified documents were ascertained through joint review by iHRIS supervisors and zonal chief medical officers. A subset (n ¼ 207) of health workers (8% of those not included) submitted appeals for review, and two-fifths (43%) of those were accepted as valid for inclusion in iHRIS.
Health worker characteristics and density
Two-thirds of the health workers included in the iHRIS database were male, and over 60% occupied clinical positions, primarily nursing-related. Non-clinical staff principally included janitorial and administrative staff. Both provinces were found to have less than one physician per 10 000 population and less than seven to eight qualified health workers per 10 000 population overall. Consistent with national trends, health worker density was higher in the urban health zones (>12 qualified health workers per 10 000 people) than in rural zones (<8 per 10 000).
Health worker compensation
Well over half of the health workers registered in iHRIS (57% in Kasaï Central and 73% in Kasaï) reported receiving no regular government pay of any kind (neither salaries nor risk allowances), instead relying solely on other forms of compensation such as facility-generated user fees or other locally generated revenues. Further reflecting the tenuous compensation status of many of the provinces' public sector health workers, only a third of Kasaï Central health workers (36%) and just one in eight (12%) in Kasaï reported having a matriculation number that would entitle them to receive a civil service salary. Lacking a matriculation number, the majority of civil service health workers in the two provinces were categorised as 'nouvelle unité' employees, even if they had been in their post for months or years. Physicians were far more likely to receive government compensation (70% of physicians) when compared with all other categories of health workers combined (34% of other cadres).
Payroll analysis
The three ministries (MoPH, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Public Service) used SYGECPAF to identify all health workers listed in the system as receiving salaries (from the Ministry of Public Service) and/or risk allowances (from the MoPH) in the two provinces, and then compared the SYGECPAF lists to iHRIS records. This analysis identified large numbers of ghost workers in both provinces for both types of compensation (Table 2) . Over onefourth (27%) of the health workers listed as salary recipients in SYGECPAF were ghost workers as determined by iHRIS, as were two-fifths (42%) of those shown by SYGECPAF to be receiving a risk allowance. The analysis did not consider health workers receiving forms of non-government remuneration not tracked in the SYGECPAF system. The payroll analysis deepened understanding of who is receiving salaries and risk allowances and made it possible to purge ghost workers from these rolls. Subsequent to the analysis, the MoPH used several criteria to reallocate funds away from ghost workers to cover salaries (n ¼ 781) and risk allowances (n ¼ 2613) for actual health workers who had not previously received any civil service compensation due to lack of funds (Table 3 ). The criteria especially targeted previously under-or uncompensated lower-and mid-level health workers in health zones with high levels of undercompensation overall. Notably, the redirected salary funds were sufficient to cover all previously unsalaried civil service health workers possessing matriculation numbers in the two provinces.
About half (49%) of the individuals receiving reallocated salaries and over two-thirds (68%) of those receiving reallocated risk allowances are cadres such as nurses, laboratory technicians and midwifery cadres; approximately one in six (17%) of those receiving reallocated salaries are physicians (Table 3) . A third of the individuals newly receiving salaries or risk allowances are in administrative positions.
Discussion
The MoPH-led effort to conduct a high-quality census of all public sector health workers in Kasaï Central and Kasaï Provinces generated easy-to-use records in iHRIS and enabled timely answers to a number of pressing questions related to the provincial-level health workforce. Before the rollout of iHRIS, which provides verified electronic health worker records that can be regularly updated, the official roster of health workers (the 'liste déclarative') was of limited value and questionable reliability.
Although iHRIS is not linked to the country's electronic payroll management system (SYGECPAF), the information contained in iHRIS (including place of employment and job and compensation status) offers a means of comparing the payroll roster to an up-todate list of who is actually working. The payroll analysis represented an unprecedented combined commitment of the ministries of Public Health (which oversees risk allowances), Public Service (which pays salaries), and Finance (which controls the overall health budget). Recognising the benefits of comparing health information systems and streamlining the payroll, the ministries used the results of their collaborative payroll analysis to redistribute unclaimed ghost worker payments to thousands of previously under-or uncompensated health workers in the civil service. With the reallocated funds, the ministries have provided salaries to 781 individuals and risk allowances to 2613 individuals, equivalent to about 1.8 million US dollars annually. In the past, unclaimed payments sent via 'bancarisation' to ghost workers were returned automatically to the central bank, but there was no mechanism to track the unclaimed funds and examine why the funds were returned, or to redistribute the funds from the central bank back to real health workers. Although the analysis of iHRIS records indicates that from over one-half to three-fourths of registered health workers in the two provinces do not receive any government compensation in the first place, the ability to mobilised and redirect scarce domestic resources to actual civil service employees represents a tangible victory for the government and the health workers themselves. Several recent studies have provided detailed insights into the complex context for health financing and health worker remuneration in the DRC (Fox et al. 2014; Bertone et al. 2016; Maini et al. 2017) . One of these studies highlights the fact that most 'recurrent inputs' at the facility level come from informal facility imposed user fees (or, to a lesser extent, from external donor payments) rather than from government sources (Fox et al. 2014) . Given the extensive bottom-up generation of revenues, it is not surprising that DRC health financing tends to 'operate in the reverse direction from that experienced in most countries', with many of the facility-level user fees 'channelled upwards to fund the functioning of higher levels of the pyramid' (Fox et al. 2014) . Although the use by health facilities and health workers of a variety of 'creative' strategies to generate income can be understood as a rational response to health sector underfunding (Bertone et al. 2016) , health economists have observed that widespread reliance on informal payments also may reflect a climate of weak management, a general lack of accountability, and possible corruption (Lewis 2007) . Additionally, from the clients' perspective, user fees may function as a financial barrier limiting access to and utilisation of health services (Lagarde and Palmer 2008; Manthalu et al. 2016; Watson et al. 2016) . Other negative ramifications of user fees may include provider reluctance to refer clients to higher-level facilities to avoid losing out on local revenues (Bertone et al. 2016) .
In the fragile state context, health sector 'boundaries between. . .public/private, for-profit/not-for-profit, [and] legal/illegal' can be 'hazy and shifting' (Durham et al. 2015) . In the DRC, experts recognised that many health workers operate outside the civil service in the for-profit, faith-based or informal sectors (Bertone et al. 2016) . Thus, the analysis of public sector iHRIS and SYGECPAF records in two DRC provinces is clearly only a partial and preliminary step toward a meaningful and comprehensive assessment of health workforce management and compensation mechanisms in all sectors. More in-depth analysis also requires acknowledging that the majority of public sector health workers do not, in fact, benefit from government compensation (either civil service salaries or risk allowances), in part because relatively few possess the matriculation number that is the pre-requisite to drawing a salary (Fox et al. 2014) . Based on its growing awareness of this problem, the MoPH announced in February 2017 its decision to implement a hiring freeze to avoid bringing any more health workers into the ranks of 'nouvelle unité' employees until it is able to 'consolidate its human resources database' and regularise the status of the existing 'nouvelle unité' employees who are 'in service but still unpaid' (Kupa 2017) . The insights furnished by iHRIS in the short time frame since the MoPH began implementing iHRIS in late 2015 are contributing to the growing evidence base in support of this regularisation process.
The DRC's ambitious 'découpage' initiative raises questions about how to strengthen health system governance at the provincial level. One observer suggests that the status of civil servant in the DRC is largely 'incompatible with the logic of territorial decentralisation' because recruitment into civil service 'emanates from the administrative hierarchy in Kinshasa, which alone has the authority to issue a [matriculation] number' (Trefon 2009 ). On the other hand, the availability of the high-quality iHRIS database and the prospect of using iHRIS to analyse and clean the payroll appears to have been motivating to provincial health officials, who are on the lookout for practical ways to take on greater ownership of human resources management and provincial-level budgetary decisions.
The work reported in this article has several limitations. First, as already mentioned, the iHRIS database only includes health workers in the civil service, but many DRC health workers carry out their work outside the public sector or across multiple sectors. Second, it is not possible to know the extent to which the two provinces' findings pertaining to ghost workers represent the situation in the rest of the country. The three ministries that coordinated the payroll analysis in Kasaï Central and Kasaï intend to carry out comparable payroll analyses in the two additional provinces where the MoPH is implementing iHRIS (Nord Ubangi and Maniema Provinces). These analyses may provide further clues about the extent to which different provinces are grappling with the ghost worker problem. Finally, while the iHRIS teams employed a number of quality assurance measures to ensure accuracy in the iHRIS database, resulting in a high degree of certainty that valid health workers were not excluded, it is possible that a small number of individuals who were not actually working or were not working in a job for which they are credentialed and qualified may have made it into the database.
The three DRC ministries' efforts to develop a solid health workforce database and to clean the payroll give rise to several recommendations. First, it should be noted that the SYGECPAF payroll system is proprietary and separate from iHRIS, which does not itself have a payroll function. Ideally, the two functions (health workforce management and payroll) should be interoperable and/or integrated, either by adapting SYGECPAF to include the functionality of iHRIS or connecting iHRIS to SYGECPAF to facilitate the routine and automated comparison of data between the two systems. Each of these options has advantages and disadvantages. In the absence of interoperability, the DRC will be faced with the continual and considerable challenge of ensuring, sometimes by hand, that both databases are up-to-date and in sync with one another.
Second, the payroll analysis carried out in just two provinces resulted in improved allocation of nearly two million US dollars benefiting thousands of previously under-or uncompensated civil service health workers. Because other provinces are equally likely to appreciate the types of analyses and evidence-based decisions that become possible when high-quality health worker data are available, there is no doubt that it would be both financially and administratively beneficial to roll out iHRIS on a larger scale. Since the initial launch of iHRIS in Kasaï Central and Kasaï, the MoPH has extended iHRIS into the two provinces of Nord Ubangi and Maniema, which means that iHRIS now covers four (15%) of the country's 26 provinces. The DRC's soon-to-be-released National Plan for the Development of Human Resources for Health for 2016-20 expresses both a political and budgetary commitment to the national rollout of iHRIS. Moreover, the national Human Resources for Health Steering Committee has formally requested support from donors for the higher-cost front-end investments (e.g. servers, computers, staff training, data gathering) that will enable the government to translate this commitment into action.
From the inception, the MoPH has conducted all iHRIS activities, and the MoPH also manages the secure server where iHRIS health worker records are stored. The aim of IntraHealth's collaboration with the MoPH has been to fully prepare the MoPH to maintain, manage, continuously update, and strategically use iHRIS. This approach includes formal and on-the-job training, coaching, and mentoring, and involves health workforce managers, decision-makers, and software technicians. IntraHealth also has supported the MoPH in the development of standard operating procedures, policies and data governance documentation. The underlying aim of this technical advisory role is to ensure that once the needed infrastructure and technical skills are in place and the financial and logistic resources are secured, it will be feasible for the MoPH to sustain iHRIS in the four provinces and extend it nationwide.
Understanding the distribution and characteristics of public sector health workers is an important step toward allowing governments to prioritised and target resources, notably in areas of particularly low health worker density. The creation of a highquality HRIS in the DRC has allowed the government to assess which civil servants (actual health workers as well as ghost workers) do and do not receive salaries and risk allowances so as to effectively manage the existing health workforce and efficiently use scarce domestic resources.
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